Social scientific accounts identified in the biological grammars of early genomics a monstrous reductionism, 'an example of brute life, the minimalist essence of things' (Rabinow, 1996, p. 89). Concern about this reductionism focused particularly on its links to modernist notions of control; the possibility of calculating, predicting and intervening in the biological futures of individuals and populations. Yet, the trajectories of the post genomic sciences have not unfolded in this way, challenging scientists involved in the production and integration of complex biological data and the interpretative strategies of social scientists honed in critiquing this reductionism. The post genomic sciences are now proliferating points from which to understand relations in biology, between genes and environments, as well as between species and spaces, opening up future possibilities and different ways of thinking about life. This paper explores the emerging topologies and temporalities of one form of post genomic research, drawing upon ethnographic research on international efforts in functional genomics, which are using mutant mice to understand mammalian gene function. Using vocabularies on the monstrous from Derrida and Haraway, I suggest an alternative conceptualisation of monstrosity within biology, in which the ascendancy of mice in functional genomics acts as a constant supplement to the reductionist grammars of genomics.
1 This paper draws on research completed as part of a set of projects around 'Biogeography and Transgenic Life', funded by an ESRC research fellowship, grant number RES-063-27-0093. It is based on ethnographic research and in-depth interviews exploring the use of mouse models in international functional genomics carried in Europe and the USA in 2009. The use of mice as models is only one of many appraochs to understanding gene function in what is sometimes characterised as the post genomic sciences. Systems biology, epigenetics, proteomics, and other model organism research would all be additional examples. The questions raised by the use of mice are slightly different, given the regulation of mammalian research and the broader cultural context to animnal experimentation. The research involved around 90 interviews with a diversity of research scientists, laboratory veterinarians, animal welfare scientists, funders and regulators, as well as participation in research meetings and international conferences. All research participants were offered anonymity.
swarms of literally thousands of animals 3 . These monstrous forms erupt periodically, but are the product of the very systems they disturb.
There have been historic attempts to incorporate mice under the auspices of human authority and law. In these attempts, another characteristic of these rodent species is evident; their capacity to unbind reason by eating through language. In The criminal prosecution and capital punishment of animals, Evans (1906) details the place of animals in the ecclesiastical courts of early modern Europe. Judicial proceedings were regularly instituted against a variety of 'rats, mice, locusts, weevils and other vermin', expelling them from orchards, vineyards and cultivated fields by means of excommunication (Evans, 1906, p. 2) . On one occasion, in the 1580s, these pests have been attacking vineyards in the south of France. An advocate is appointed for the animals and a visit to the vines arranged to survey the damage.
The ecclesiastical court meets, but the sitting is constantly adjourned as arguments circle around the place of these animals within law and the potential for finding them land outside the vineyard. The book recounts these moral and spatial complexities for several pages. Yet, despite repeated sittings the outcome remains obscure. 'The final decision of the case, after such careful deliberation and so long delay is rendered doubtful by the unfortunate circumstance that the last page of the records has been destroyed by rats or bugs of some sort' (Evans, 1906, p. 49) . Elsewhere, 'Rabelais complains that rats have eaten the beginning of his book; and Racine reminds his son to tell his mother to put a little water in the bookcase to prevent the mice from devouring his library' (Ellman, 2004, p. 70) . The animal's surplus gnaws through language and the law used to try and tame them.
More recently, the biological exuberance of these animals has been more thoroughly, though not totally, domesticated. Karen Rader provides a compelling history of the process of making standardized laboratory mice from the late nineteenth century to the 1950s (Rader, 2004) . It was from the Victorian fancy rat and mouse societies that early experiments in breeding developed the inbred strains critical to twentieth century developments in cancer research, toxicology testing and mammalian genetics. The very characteristics which made these animals pests, their resilience in the face of inbreeding and their fast reproduction, made 2 As Elizabeth Costello reflects in Coetzee's novel of the same name: 'Rats haven't surrendered. They fight back. They form themselves into underground units in our sewers. They aren't winning, but they aren't losing either ' (2003, p. 105) .
3 The destructive capacities of mouse swarms are more commonly associated with the corn ricks and storage barns of pre-industrial agriculture, but they can still be seen in footage filmed in Southern Australia in 1993. Search for mouse swarm or plague on the internet, and the video that most often comes up is a recording, screened on the Guinness world record show, showing mice swarming within the livestock sheds of Australian farms. The first frames of the footage warns you may find the images offensive; yet it is only mice. Just lots of mice, more than you might want to imagine. them easy to reproduce in large number and identical form in the laboratory. This domestication does not happen once, but repeatedly, with the identification of locally interesting animals and the divergent activities of individual laboratories. The result is a swarm of inbred mouse strains across the laboratories of the world; the mouse genealogy map identifying at least 450 different strains (Beck et al, 2000) . Yet, following the period covered by Rader's book, mice become more marginal figures, at least within sociological narratives of post-war biological innovation. They figure as only bit parts in the main dramas of molecular biology and embryology, taking supporting roles as experimental precursors or assembled into experimental apparatus as merely feeder cells (Franklin, 2006) . There is no social scientific analysis of the development of mouse embryonic stem cells; biopolitical commentaries move quickly from experiments in mouse IVF to something larger and more interesting. In tracing the phases of pharmaceutical development there is considerable attention to human clinical trials, but little on these animal's contributions to pre-clinical testing (Lezaun, 2010) . Where they do feature, it is as emblematic of the contestation of intellectual property claims in the patenting of mammalian genes (Haraway, 1997; Robins, 2008) . In these practices, genetics comes to the fore and the animal body is restrained in pursuit of the production and ownership of biological information.
It is after the mapping of the genome that the mouse body re-emerges as the duplicitous supplement to genetics. Akin to Derrida's monstrous arrivant, the mouse arrives again from the margins, functioning as a biological excess, decentring the logocentric assumptions in genetics, revealing their partial domestication to the grammars of biology in which they are inserted. Laboratory mice retain their ability to decompose 'connections, unweaving webs, untying texts, unnetting networks' (Ellman, 2004, p. 70) . They may again be eating the words we use to try to tame them, rewriting the texts of biology and remaking the biotextual forms in which we meet the monstrous. cordiality and security, we tour the facilities. As we set off, he pauses in front of this view.
Supplementing Genomics
This, he says, reflects the change in emphasis in our work.
Figure 1: Aerial Photograph of Centre for Gene Sequencing and Functional Genomics
He points out the buildings to the north of the site, pictured at the top of the image. These are grey, box-like structures, arranged at a series of angles. They juxtapose awkwardly with the landscape. He makes the analogy that they look like a series of non-descript grey office computers, ones that were ubiquitous in the late 1990s. And they do, he says, contain a lot of computers. The buildings were the main site for the sequencing work done here to map the human genome. This was an internationally collaborative, and at times, competitive effort, with individual researchers working on mapping different chromosomes or genes (CookDeegan, 1994; Balmer, 1996) . The majority of this work was achieved using biological samples and large sequencing computers. It is biology as code, genomics as technics; its relation to the rest of biology, to the landscape around it for the time being irrelevant. He tells me the buildings are organized into linear corridors, each focusing on a given area of the genome. These elements could then be easily added together. All had shared understandings of this project, mapping the complexity of biology to extract a four letter code.
The adjacent artwork is a representation of the outcome of this mapping project. It is a long list of letters -A T C G -placing the 3 billion base pairs that make up human DNA. The project was completed early and with considerable publicity, which at the time portrayed it as the ultimate description of humanity. The logocentrism at the centre of genomics has been the subject of considerable commentary (Rabinow, 1996; Kay, 2000; Botting, 2003) . This critique is enmeshed with a particular notion of genetic essentialism that positioned the gene as originary code for the creation event of each species and for each individual of that species.
However, the eventual story of the human genome project was not about what the genome 'told us': it was, and has been increasingly since, about what the genome didn't reveal (Keller, 2002; Clayton, 2005) . On its own, this long list of letters tells us very little. Without establishing relations -between species and between genes, proteins, pathways and bodiesit is a map without a referent, the ultimate reduction of human biology to mere DNA.
He then points out the newer set of buildings to the south. These are rounded, placed within the landscape, planted with sedum roofs and fronted with cedar wood, which has weathered to a warm brownish cream. They are, he says, fuzzy organic structures. This is the location of research to add the complexities of biology back onto this genetic sequence. It is here they are developing their work in functional genomics, searching for the functions and interactions of each mapped gene in whole organisms. They do this by working with model organisms;
by developing an array of mouse embryonic stem cells, then deriving mice which have a human genome project. Functional genomics requires additional translations between different species, practices and languages, and across different spaces too. These interactions take place informally, in conferences, and on-line. In the centre, towards the bottom of the image, is a building more closely resembling those above. This is the new bioinformatics building, with the computational power to process this new information. Whereas the first set of buildings was about constructing biological data through computers and as code, this second set of buildings is designed to generate biological data through the practices of mutation; though the generation of monsters perhaps. Yet, technical diagramming is still crucial to efforts to make sense of the potential of this biological excess (Leonelli, 2008) . This is after all big science, and the data generated here have to coordinate with other international initiatives, even if these are now more complex to standardize and integrate. . Additional litters may be needed to determine whether the mutation is inherited, crosses can be necessary to locate the identity of the altered gene and breeding may be required to shift the mutation onto a stable inbred strain background, turning the mutant animal into a useable scientific tool. At this stage though, the specific effect of this mutagen on these animals is unknown. The technique was developed for large-scale screening of mutants in drosophila flies, though it also has echoes of post-war research on the mutagenic effects of radioactivity. It has only recently been adopted for largescale genetic screens in mammals, and for some it is controversial (Qiu, 2006) . To others, it is the best way of producing mutants with novel potential for developing understandings of human biology (Balling et al, 2000) . If the representational practices of both art and science are considered useful to understanding the modernist syntax of the human genomic project (Anker and Nelkin, 2004; Schlick, 2005) , an alternative perspective may be beneficial here. The comparison can be made between approaches to knowledge personified by two British men, both named Francis Bacon, divided by centuries and by scientific and artistic focus. The first, the scientist philosopher, put mathematics at the centre of his quest for knowledge at the start of the Enlightenment. In the 'Advancement of Learning' (1605), he writes against objections to empirical investigation, advocating knowledge as central to human advancement, separating man from animality and ultimately transcending corporeality. 'By learning man excelleth in that wherein man excelleth beasts; that by learning man ascendeth to the heavens and their motions, where in body he cannot come' (Bacon, 1994, p. 48) . Later, in the same text, he suggests natural philosophers should learn from the language of mathematics, seeking 'in all controversies and disputations to imitate the wisdom of the mathematicians, in setting down in the very beginning the definitions of our words and terms' (Bacon, 1994, p. 99 The parallels with the return of the body to biology, after the hubristic grammars of the human genome project, are provocative. In this experimental formulation, biological understanding proceeds through the adventitious production of these multiple and multiply differentiated bodies. Yet, many of these animals lack the markers associated with classical notions of monstrosity. Gross developmental abnormalities are relatively rare; in fact, many animals generated by ENU appear surprisingly normal. ENU produces often subtle point mutations on a single gene. The idea of the monster is closely related to what is normal, but
here it is the normal animals which are of little interest. The normal phenotype does not invite further enquiry, we can learn nothing new from them. In fact, the number of normal animals is a problem for this experimental system. Such normality is excessive to its demands for emergence. This approach is known as forward genetics: it is from the mutation event that the potential for future understandings of corporeal difference emerge. This differentiated body precedes the naming of the trait, or the identification of the gene. These random moments of biological emergence are freed from the assumptions of existing knowledges and forms. As in the return to figuration in painting, these unforeseen events may be a necessary remonstration to the logocentric assumptions of genetics. It has not been possible to set down, in the very beginning, a single definition of a gene, or static rules for gene transcription, translation or interaction. Perhaps it was the determination to define linear relations in biology which was monstrous. To return to Derrida again, 'Writing, like all artificial languages one would wish to fix and remove from the living history of the natural language, participates in the monstrosity. It is a deviation from nature'. He goes on, 'Spontaneous life must be protected' (Derrida, 1998, p. 38) . Even within specialist facilities there are contingencies, as each institution may favour different protocols for testing animals. It is well known that the outcomes of phenotyping tests are influenced by animal husbandry, the order of experiments, and microbial and other environmental factors. It may be possible to control for these, but more than that, there are still unknown contingencies and operator effects which are more labile (Crabbe et al, 1999) .
Comprehensibility and Hospitality
Practices of testing within institutions and disciplinary areas are also slow to change. The testing apparatus have evolutionary histories too, relating past and current research within disciplinary areas. As Hacking observes, 'there evolves a curious tailor-made fit between our ideas, our apparatus, and our observations. A coherence theory of truth? No, a coherence theory of thought, action, materials, and marks' (1992, p. 58). Many of the apparatus for testing differences in learning, memory, anxiety and social behaviours were developed through behavioural studies on rats. Despite a large and sometimes critical literature on phenotyping screens (Crawley, 2007; Justice, 2008) , tests judged insensitive in screening populations are still routinely used in individual institutions (Brown and Balling, 2001 1984) , but its use is still increasing. It is popular for testing animal models for their relevance to research on Alzheimer's disease. In the test, the mouse swims in a shallow tray of water, until it locates an underwater platform, on which it can rest. In repeated experiments visual clues lead back to the platform, and the time taken to return is used as a measure of spatial learning and memory. The advantage of such tests is their simplicity and reproducibility.
Data can easily be generated from new genetically altered animals and articulate with existing disciplinary data sets. The strange can be made comprehensible.
But something is lost in this subjection of the animal body to the demands of disciplinary contexts. The complex relations between gene expression and bodily capacities are obscured through the lack of fit between the experimental system in which the apparatus was developed and this new biological form. The Morris Water Maze was originally designed for rats, who love to swim. Mice, on the other hand, avoid water. She suggests the test may more accurately represent anxiety related behaviours in this species. The favoured laboratory strain of mice on which genetic alterations are inserted, the C57 black 6, loses eye-sight early due to its inbred nature. 'to welcome the monstrous arrivant, to welcome it, that is to accord hospitality to that which is absolutely foreign or strange' (Derrida, 1995, 387) . The relative lack of expertise in whole animal biology, the shortage of behavioural ethology and veterinary pathology (Barthold et al, 2007) , hinders this hospitality. As the number of mutant mice waiting to be phenotyped becomes a deluge (Abbott, 2004) , these issues are increasingly, centrally, important. There are some who will assert the unproblematic value of techniques like ENU mutagenesis.
Monstrous ambiguities
For them, it is the best way to develop new mutants which have novel potential for modelling diseases. The ethical imperative here is the need to do something to alleviate human suffering.
It becomes a technological imperative. We can do this so we should do it, even if the outcomes are not clear. There are also those who assert, this is unethical, all animal experimentation should stop. Their position is a priori. They are not interested in refinements, reductions, only in replacement. These are both well established positions, and well known to each other, shaping the space for debate. But they are arguably no longer where the difficult and hesitant work of ethics is being done. Haraway is useful here. In When Species Meet she suggests, 'I refuse the "choice" of "inviolable animal rights" versus "human good is more important." Both of these proceed as if calculation solved the dilemma, and all I or we have to do is choose ' (2008, p. 87) . There may, instead, be value in 'staying with the trouble' (Haraway, 2010) . Rather than seeking resolution through calculating cost and benefit, there is an ethical consequence to 'keeping the debate wide open by multiplying the signs of critical tension, of contradictions, or dilemmas, even aporias' (Derrida, 2002, p. 210) .
I probe this hesitation in discussion with individuals later in the research. The inability to choose, the pause, is the start of some unexpected kinds of questioning. At the moment these are proceeding through personal narrative and anecdote as positions shift and new concerns, as well as new opportunities, emerge. I talk to someone from a laboratory animal supplier.
She knows people who have left the industry, as they felt they could not kill another mouse. This is not the individual animal suffering which traditionally mobilises animal rights, but the personal affective toll taken by having to cull large numbers of apparently healthy animals.
The practices of euthanasia, of providing a good death for animals at the end of the experiment, the process perhaps of 'killing well' (Haraway, 2008) , becomes monstrous through sheer repetition. I talk to others working broadly within the animal care community.
For them, there are opportunities for new interventions and collaborations around these animal numbers. They are working with funders and scientists to increase access to previously protected animals resources, to share already generated mouse models, to develop skills for cryopreserving animal strains, to co-ordinate the production of phenotype data and so reduce the number of live animals used across the research community. The ethical prompting of functional genomics is emerging around how to manage excess, whether experimental, corporeal or affective.
Following Haraway, it is possible to suggest these 'monsters' have promise, a promise to put diversity, difference and alterity at the centre of biology and to reshape biomedical practices around them. There is a return to biological complexity and a consideration of embodiment after the modernist logics of genomics. In the abstract I quoted Rabinow: 'if there ever was an example of brute life, the minimalist essence of things, it is genomics ' (1999, p. 89) . This period of genetic reductionism and determinism reached its limit. No one could say this now.
The production of bodily diversity in mice is being used to say something different about the nature of embodied life. As the early grammars of genetics are decentred by its supplements, so other kinds of expertise and care are increasingly important. . There are cautions as well, for there are those who may have no wish, or cannot find ways, to cede the authority or power they hold under older arrangements. Whilst I have enjoyed encounters with reflective individuals, the technical devices and commercial imperatives which articulate these animal bodies with past research, international efforts, and future treatments may be more resistant to change, and limit the things these bodies can say (see also Davies, 2010) . And there is pathos too. Charged with finding ways of controlling mouse populations in the warehouses of post-war Britain, ethologist Peter Crowcroft set up a barn-sized experiment to explore the territorial and reproductive strategies through which these individual animals manage their own excessive potential. As Crowcroft watches the mice strive, succeed and fail, he notes 'the awakening of a sensibility I had formerly lacked; the capacity to feel compassion. There is something terribly familiar about the awful situation of a mouse in the world ' (1966, p. 2).
Relating post genomics
The word monster is related to Monstrare, meaning to show forth or to signify (Shildrick, 2002) . The same root gives us terms such as monitoring and demonstration, which have become vital to scientific projects (Barry, 2001 ), but it also bring remonstrations too. practice, for both the sciences and the social sciences too.
In conclusion, I want to return to the relations between corporeality, time, space and language at stake in the shifting cartographies of the monstrous. The mice themselves draw attention to the emerging spatio-temporal dynamics of this complexity. Genetics, when couched in deterministic and reductionist terms, tended to imply the possibility of predicting, calculating and intervening in the future, of controlling or altering biological destiny. This was the location of its most strident aspirations, and also its most trenchant critics (Jasanoff, 2006) . In this determinist incarnation, ethical perspectives on genetics tended to oscillate between the technological imperative that something must be done, and the cautionary injunction that something should be proscribed, as if the ethico-political implications of biology merely involved varying velocities along a pre-designated technology trajectory. Yet, this was based on simplistic assumptions about genes that have been superseded. We now find ourselves somewhere different. The monstrosity of mice is a necessary remonstration to this reductionism. Just as modernist 'literature needs rats to riddle it with gaps' (Ellman, 2004, p. 71), so, by gnawing holes in the whole of nature (Milburn, 2003) , the mice supplement genomics and supplant its perceptibility. As one Professor of Genetics, suggests, 'At the moment, we struggle with having three or four genes, when we make our drawings in PowerPoint. This will not be the way to tackle it in the next decade. [...] Some people have thought: why not do it, not with words, but maybe with tones.
How can we receive the information? How can we visualise it? Of course I don't know. They're just weird ideas. But we have to work on that. For the future' (Professor of Genetics, Interview 2009).
These mice bore holes into the future, destabilizing the technological horizons imagined through genetic discourse at its most simplistic, opening up future possibilities and ways of thinking about the ethical. This monstrosity returns a future to this arena of biology; 'A future that would not be monstrous would not be a future; it would already be a predictable, calculable and programmable tomorrow' (Derrida, 1995, p. 386) . There is a reaching towards something new, but it is uncertain and hesitant; the monstrous arrivant unsettles our conceptual and perceptual categories. The monstrous potential of post genomics is finally a challenge to the vocabularies of social science too. The critical social scientific commentaries of reductionist genetics suddenly
